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Error-Correcting Codes for Authentication
and Subliminal Channels
Reihameh S. Safavi-Naini, Member, IEEE, and Jennifer R. Seberry, Member, IEEE

Abstract-The application of coding theory to security scenarios is
studied. Authentication systems are introduced that are based on algebraic codes and provide high protection against an intruder's impersonation and substitution attacks. It is shown that a subliminal channel can
be embedded into these systems and that there is a trade-off between the
authentication capability, subliminal capacity and error protection capability.
Index Terms-Authentication code, subliminal channel, McEliece
cryptosystem, algebraic code, secrecy.

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE MAIN MOTIVATION for the study of coding theory has been the protection of discrete signals from
noise. However, the results of these studies have proved
beneficial in many other engineering and mathematical contexts. In this paper we look at some possible applications of
algebraic codes to security. The most interesting feature of
these applications is that they can easily lead to schemes in
whic~ the combination of security and protection is possible,
and m some cases a trade-off between the two is noticeable.
Although we do mention secrecy systems based on algebraic
codes, the main aim of the paper is to introduce authentication schemes that are hard to deceive and can include subliminal channels. The price to be paid in this case is a reduction
in true authentication capability of the communicants.
Section II is devoted to a review of some basic definitions
and concepts of coding theory and authentication systems. A
more complete treatment of these can be found in [1] and [2]
respectively. In Section III, the application of coding theory
to secrecy is examined, and in Section IV, authentication
systems are introduced that are hard to deceive. In Section V
it is shown that subliminal channels can be embedded in
these systems and in Section VI some concluding remarks
are presented.

matrix G and the parity check matrix H of the code can
always be written as

where A is an arbitrary k X (n - k) binary matrix. A binary
k-tuple i is encoded to c, where c = iG. A noise vector n
added to a codeword c results in a vector r = c + n. If
when) ~ t = l( d -1)/2J, c can be recovered by forming the
syndrome vector syn (r ) = rH T, finding the corresponding
coset leader e r and decoding c = r + er •
We consider the authentication scenario proposed by
Simmons [3]. Briefly, a transmitter wants to send the state of
a source to a distant receiver over a publicly exposed channel. The enemy tries to fool the receiver into accepting a
fraudulent message produced by him/her as a genuine one.
Authentication amounts to determining whether or not a
received message is in the subset of acceptable messages. An
arbiter can always verify the authenticity of the transmitted
message.
Authentication codes can achieve these requirements by
coding a source state to a cryptogram that is easily decodable
by the legitimate receiver. An authentication code is a set E
of encoding
rules. Each encoding rule A·I is a one-to-one
.
mappmg of the elements of the set of source states S onto
the elements of some subset of the set of authentic messages
M. The inverse mapping used by the receiver is A:- 1 where
the index i is the secret key information that the tr~nsmitter
and receiver share.
An authentication system can provide protection against
deception by the enemy only if IMI > lSI. We call an authentication system hard to deceive if it is easy for the transmitter
and receiver in possession of the key information to encode
and decode, easy for the arbiter to check the authenticity of
a transmitted message, but computationally infeasible for an
enemy to succeed in a substitution attack.

II. BACKGROUND

Let Vn denote the n-dimensional vector space over GF(2).
The number of nonzero components of a vector v =
(VI' V 2 , • " V n ) is the Hamming weight of v and is denoted by
Wh(V). A linear code C of length n, dimension k and
minimum distance d is denoted by (n, k, d). The generator
Manuscript received February 27, 1989; revised May 21, 1990.
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III. CODING AND SECRECY

Algebraic codes can be used to provide security. The
symmetric cryptosystem in Section III-A uses automorphisms
of a linear code to provide security.
A. Symmetric Cryptosystem

A linear (n, k, d) code C can be used as a block cipher
algorithm. The ciphertext block c corresponding to a plaintext block i is obtained as c = iG, where G, is a generator
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matrix of the code. The possible generator matrices are
labeled by I, which is the key. The number of possible keys
for this system is
k-l
K =

f1

(2k

_2i).

o

Proof" See Appendix A.

We propose two possible choices of .:1 with the corresponding M s by employing the cryptosystems discussed in
the previous section. It will be shown that the asymmetric
system is hard to deceive.

j=O
In this system, the set of cryptograms is always the same
(the set of codewords of C), but the generator matrix used
determines the actual one-to-one correspondence between
the plaintext and the ciphertext. The expansion in the length
of the message can be used for error protection purposes or
employed as a manipulation detection property of the
crypto-algorithm, both using the minimum distance between
the cryptograms, which is d in this case.
However, the system is not secure, as access to k plaintext/ciphertext pairs enables the enemy to reconstruct the
generator matrix.

A. Symmetric Authentication System

In the symmetric system proposed, M is the set of nonzero
elements of an (n, nl' d) code C and 8j is defined by a
generator matrix lj of C:

m

=

xlj •

The code is publicly known but the specific generator
matrix used is the secret key information shared by the
transmitter and receiver.
As noted earlier the number of possible j is

B. Asymmetric Cryptosystems

One of the earliest and yet resistant public key cryptosystems is the system proposed by McEliece, which is based on
the known difficulty of the general decoding problem [4, pp.
108-111].

mEM,

XE v,."

nl-l

f1

1.:11 =

(2n,

_2i).

i=O
Altogether, the number of possible (I'i' 8) pairs is
but the number of distinct encoding rules is

In x 1.:11,

k-l

IV. CODES AND AUTHENTICATION
We propose two authentication systems based on algebraic
codes. The encoding rules in each system consist of the
composition of two mappings performed in two stages. The
first stage, which is common to both systems, serves to add
the required redundancy by embedding the set of source
states S (represented by the subset of non-zero elements of
Vk ) into a larger set, Vn " n l > k. The specific mapping used
in this stage is only known to the communicants. The second
stage is aimed mainly at obscuring the first stage transformation by mapping Vn , onto M c Vn , n > nl' where M is the set
of authentic messages, to be defined in each case.
A mapping I'i of the first stage is specified by a linear code
Cj with generator matrix G i = [IkIA], where A is an arbitrary k X(nl - k) binary matrix:
I'j:S-'X,

f1 (2 n , _2i).

i=O

Example 4.1: Let k = 2, nl = 4, n = 5. f consists of(4,2, d)
codes Ci where
G.* =
I

a2

Gt is an arbitrary 2x2 matrix with index i = EJ=oaj X2 j .
M is the set of codewords of C, a four-dimensional subspace
of Vs:
C={OOOOO,I000I,01001,00101,OOOII,II000,10100,10010,
01100,01010,OOI10,11101,10111,11011,01111,11110}.
A mapping 8j E.:1 is given by a generator matrix lj of the
code C. The number of such matrices is

SES,

3

f1 (24 _2i) = 20160.

X=sG i •
The set of all possible mappings of stage one is denoted by
f, and In = 2(n,-k)xk.
The set .:1 of mappings of stage two is different for each
system and will be defined separately later.
An encoding rule Al consists of I'i E f followed by 8j E.:1.
The elements of v.: can be partitioned into two subsets
Vn1
and v,.2,1 where v,.f'consists
of those elements of v.:n I with
1
1
at least one nonzero component in their first k coordinate
places, and v,.2 consists of those vectors that have these
components all'zero. Vectors of v,.2 form a subspace, but the
sum of two vectors of Vn1 can res~lt in a vector of Vn2 • It is
noted that only x E v,.1, (ahd not x E v,.2)
, can be in the lmage
of I' E f.
Lemma 4.1: Every nonzero element of v,.1 is in the image of exactly 2(n, -kXk-l) mappings I'i E f. '

[a o

i=O

As an example let the encoding rule be specified by the
generator matrices G s of the first stage and 1 of the second
stage, where

J~ [~ °° °° °
0

Gs=[~

°
1

1
1

~],

1
1

1
1

0
1

n

Composition of the mappings of the two stages results in a
matrix T

°1
such that
m=sT,

1
1

°° ~]

r

I
I

I
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e.g., the source state s = [1 0] results in the cryptogram
m =[1 0 1 0 0].

matrix and S is a nonsingular k X k binary matrix. Matrix G'
is made public. The set of authentic messages M is

Let PA (·) denote probability distribution on the set A.
The following theorem ensures the security of the system in
an impersonation attack.

M=
S~(e) =

Theorem 4.1: If Pi'), P r (·) and Pa.<·) are uniform, then
PM( . ) is uniform.

In an impersonation attack, since the enemy has not yet
intercepted any cryptogram, he/she does not have a better
strategy than random selection with uniform distribution
from M, and in this case his/her probability of success is

2k -1
2 n , -1
Suppose the enemy intercepts a cryptogram m and he/she
would like to substitute it with m' such that his/her probability of success is maximized. This corresponds to finding
the subset Lm c M such that P(m'lm) is maximum for m' E
L m , where P(m'lm) is the probability of m' being a valid
cryptogram when m is the intercepted cryptogram. But,

1

P(m'm)
P(m'lm)

=

()

P m

= -(-) X

P m

{m E VnIO:;;; wh(m + e):;;; t, e E C},
I

IS~(e)l=u~= E (~).

o

Proof" See Appendix A.

U S~(e),
cEC

i=O

I

An encoding rule Ai consists of a linear map Yi E
followed by a probabilistic mapping i) defined as

i):x-+m,

mEM,

m=xG'+n,
where n is selected randomly with uniform distribution from
the set S~(O) (of size uD. The image of v,.1, under i) is
Y c M. Let Yx denote the set of possible images of x E v,.~
(Y = S~(e) where ex = xG'); then for x, x' E v,.~ we have
xi=x'.
Lemma 4.2: The probability distribution over Y is uniform.

Proof" Follows from uniform distribution over v,.~ and

EPim'mlx'x)P(x'x),
x'x

S~(O).

where PIl(m'mlx'x) is the total probability of the mappings
such that
i): x' -+ m',
i): x-+m.
This probability is

i)

0

The system satisfies the requirements of a hard to deceive
authentication system as follows.
• Encoding is easy. The cryptogram corresponding to s
under a key i is m where

1

m=(xG')+n.

• The receiver can easily decode the message because
he / she knows Sand P and hence

and hence
P(m'lm)

r

Pim'mlx'x)
=

()

P m

1

X

Ep(x'x)

x'x

=

-n-,-,
2 -2

which clearly shows that the interception of a cryptogram
does not help the enemy in devising a strategy better than
random selection with uniform distribution, and his/her
probability of success in this case is

2k -2
2 n '-2
However, the interception of the second cryptogram raises
the probability of success of the enemy to one! This is
because of the linearity of the system, which ensures b =
m + m' is a valid cryptogram under the authentication key
used for m and m'.
B. Asymmetric Authentication
As was noted earlier the symmetric system is not hard to
deceive. The following system overcomes this difficulty by
employing the asymmetric cryptosystem mentioned in Section III-A.
Let C be a linear (n, k, d) code with an easy decoding
algorithm corresponding to the generator matrix G and
parity check matrix H (e.g., Goppa code). The structure of
G is scrambled to G' = SGP where P is a permutation

mp- l = (xSGP)P- 1 + np- l = (xS)G

+ n'.

l

P is a permutation matrix, so p- is also a permutation

matrix, and thus:
wh(n')

=

wh(n):;;; t.

Now (xS) can be recovered using the easy decoding
algorithm, and, as S is nonsingular, x can be found and
its corresponding s is the first k components of x as C i
is systematic.
• It is easy for the arbiter to check the authenticity of a
received message as he/she also knows P and S matrices and is able to use the easy decoding algorithm to
remove the noise. His/her successful decoding proves
the authenticity of the cryptogram.
• Impersonation and substitution are hard because, from
Lemma 4.2, the best strategy for impersonation is random selection with uniform distribution from Y of size
u~(2n, - 2 n,-k). Interception of a cryptogram m will
affect the optimum strategy by reducing the size of the
set of possible cryptograms by at most u~. Cryptograms
that are close to m will be accepted by the receiver with
a high probability but they are not good choices as they
are decoded to the same s.
Asymmetric authentication systems provide security even
if a second cryptogram m' is intercepted. The enemy could

IEEE TRANSACfIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 37, NO.1, JANUARY 1991

16

succeed in his/her deception if he/she could decode m and
m' to obtain x, x' E v,,1 and form b = (x + x')G' + n, the
bogus message that is ~ccepted by the receiver. However,
this is not computationally feasible because of the difficulty
of the decoding problem.

V.

SUBLIMINAL CHANNELS

Subliminal channels are introduced by Simmons. He
showed it is possible for two parties to communicate over an
authentication-without-secrecy channel and exchange information unreadable by the authenticator. The channel through
which this information transfer takes place is called the
subliminal channel. It is pointed out in [5] that in order to
communicate Hm bits of information with Hr bits of authentication, Hr + Hm bits in total must be exchanged. In fact
the transmitter/receiver can give up some of their authentication capability without the host being aware of it, and use
the extra capacity Hs bits to communicate secretly.
We propose two possible modifications of the first stage of
the authentication schemes proposed in the previous section
to include a subliminal channel in the system. In both cases
the second stage remains untouched.

A. Noise Addition
The redundancy added in the first stage can be exploited
to establish a subliminal channel between the communicants.
The capacity of the channel is equal to the number of
redundant bits added.
Suppose the transmitter wants to send s to the receiver
using a key i. He/she can include one subliminal bit in
his/her message by adding a noise bit to one of the (n 1 - k)
last bits of x = sG i to obtain x'. The receiver recovers x'
after decoding of the second stage and hence determines s
as the first k components of x'. Moreover he/she can find
any error in the last (n1 - k) bits, simply by calculating
xr = sG i and x' + xr. Hence the capacity of the subliminal
channel is log2(n 1 - k + 1).
In general, the previous procedure allows the communicants to establish a subliminal channel of capacity (nl - k)
because any error vector e E Vn of weight wh(e)::::; n 1 - k
whose nonzero components are in the last n1 - k positions
can be determined. Since the code of the first stage is only
known to the transmitter and receiver, the information represented by the noise pattern remains exclusive to them.

B. Partitioning of r
Another way of embedding a subliminal channel in the
system is by partitioning the set f into p = 2 k (n,-k)-1 subsets Ei such that
p

f= UEi'

by the subliminal bit accompanying s, i.e., a subliminal j,
= 0,1, is sent by employing yf in stage one.
As the receiver has the key, he/she can decode the second
stage and obtain x E Vn1 • Because the codes of the first stage
are systematic, the first 'k bits of x actually determine the s,
and it is easy for the receiver to check which generator
matrix in Ei is used, hence obtaining the subliminal bit.
Partitioning of the set of codes of f is equivalent to
reducing the effective size of the key space by a factor of
two, hence losing one bit uncertainty about the authentication key. This bit is the capacity of the subliminal channel
established between the communicants.
The capacity of the subliminal channel can be increased by
using partitions which include subsets Ei of cardinality more
than two, resulting in one bit extra subliminal capacity by
doubling the size of the subsets E i •
The communicants can exploit both channels simultaneously. While the first one can be considered as a free
channel (as the extra bits are added in the first stage of
encoding of the source states), the second one is paid off by
the reduction in the effective size of the set of encoding
rules, i.e., reduction in authentication capability of the communicants.
Example 5.1: In the Table I of Appendix B we give a
partition of the set of codes of Example 4.1 where q, j = 0,1
and 1::::; i ::::; 8 are given in the last two columns of the table.
The codes in the first column can be used to send a subliminal zero while the second column is used for sending a
subliminal one.

j

VI.

CONCLUSION

The application of algebraic codes to security can result in
cryptographically resistant systems that combine security and
error protection. We have used secure systems based on
algebraic codes to design the so-called hard to deceive authentication codes that can include subliminal channels. The
two types of subliminal channels discussed are different by
nature and hence can be established simultaneously in a
system.
While the first channel is always present in the system, the
prerequisite for establishing the second one is the existence
of certain types of partitioning of the set of encoding rules.
Although an example is provided, the question of what
systematic procedure should be used to obtain one, remains
unanswered.
Both symmetric and asymmetric authentication codes can
also cater for controlling errors by requiring that the codes of
the first stage have certain minimum distance or using error
correcting capability of the code of the second stage.
The trade-off between authentication capability, subliminal capacity and error control properties of the system, is
clearly seen as the minimum distance of the code is the
crucial parameter in all these cases.

i=1

cpncl= 0,
where cf c v" , j = 0,1 are the sets of nonzero elements of
the images of 'Yf, j = 0,1. This partitioning is only known to
the transmitter and receiver. A given key determines the
subset Ei to be used for the first stage and the actual code
used by the transmitter in Ei for encoding s is determined
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APPENDIX

A

Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let XEv,,~ and x=(x 1,x 2 , " ' ,
x k, •• " X n) where not all Xi' 1 ::::; i ::::; k are zero. As Yi corre-

[
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sponds to a systematic code, Sx = (Xl' X2' . " xk) is the
unique source state that can be mapped onto x. This requires the row vectors g;, 1:5; i :5; k of G i satisfy the following equation:

APPENDIX

PARTITION OF THE SET OF CoDES OF EXAMPLE

0 0

(1)

[:

i=l

So (k -1) row vectors of G i can be chosen arbitrarily and
the last row vector gp with xp 0, is uniquely obtained from
(1). The result follows from counting the number of possible

*

[:

From these assumptions we have
=

0,

because none of the 'Yi E r maps an s E S onto an element
is uniform and
of Vn2I . However Pyl(x)
nl
PV;I(X)

=

E

[:

S;ES

[:

where Pr(xls) is the total probability of mappings 'Yj E r
that map si onto x. As 'Yj corresponds to a systematic code,
there is a unique Sx that can be mapped onto a given x.
Hence

1 0 0
1 1 0

where Nr(sx; x) is given by

E6 = {CS,Cl l }

and from Lemma 4.1 we have

[:
induces a uniform distri-

I

1 1 1
1 1 0

: :]
0 1

[

1 1

1 0

1 0 0

0 1 1

1 0 1

1 1 1

1 0 0
1.

1

1 1 0
1 1 0

: :]
[:
[

1 1

0

0 0
1 0
1 0

1 0

1 1

0 1 0

1 0

:1

1

1 1 1

0 0

0 0

1 1

1 0

1

:]

0 1

0 1

:

[

0 0 1

1 0 0

:

[

4.1

0 0 1

0 0 0

[:

v"l

1 0

:] [:

0 1 1

Ps(s;}Pr{xls;},

The uniform distribution of
bution on M as

1 0

0 1 0

GiS.

P y nl(d)

B

TABLE I
A

k

EXigi=X.
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: 1 [:

1 0

0 1 1

1 0

1 1 0

0 1 0

1 0 1

1

:1

:]
:1

1

1

:1
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